











El Serafy User costs and their implications for macroeconomic 
policy in Africa’s mineral rich economies 
 
“[N]atural resources are not purchased from Mother Nature who produced them so that their 
valuation must inevitably be artificial and controversial… the national accounts ought not to 
show the using up of assets whose creation has not first been recorded in the accounts.… 
Nature is not recognised as a factor of production by economists or national accountants and 
nature's production of resources is not, and perhaps could never be, recorded in the accounts.” 
Derek Blades (1989) 
 
Abstract  
Many of Africa’s economies are mineral based. Their sustainability and their macroeconomic 
vulnerability to market fluctuations are accordingly matters of direct concern. This thesis 
asks how much of the proceeds of mining in such countries can be safely spent each year. 
Using El Serafy’s approach to the ‘proper’ definition of National Income, it recomputes Net 
Domestic Product in 11 mineral-based African economies and tests for their macroeconomic 
sustainability. The study finds a disturbingly poor level of sustainability in several of them; 
with aggregate expenditures in excess of the levels posited under efficient resource rent 
management given the El Serafy User cost approach. The study estimates the budget deficit 
and national debt as a proportion of net national product adjusted for mineral resource 
depletion in each country and evaluates the outcome by comparison with standard ‘rules of 
thumb’ concerning ‘acceptable’ fiscal deficits and national debt levels. The outcome reveals 
that using GDP as an anchor as opposed to an ‘appropriate’ measure that adjust for mineral 
resource depletion by policy-makers may lead to the implementation of sub-optimal 
economic policies which are detrimental for sustainable income growth and development. 
The findings from the study therefore highlight the need for more efficient resource 
management as well as the development of a ’properly defined‘ national income which 
corrects for resource depletion to inform sustainable fiscal policy. 
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Africa is in a considerably better social and economic situation today than it was at the start 
of the century. In the last 10 to 20 years, sub-Saharan Africa has made considerable 
progress forward and is now one of the world’s fastest growing continents (World Bank, 
2015). The GDP growth rate of the sub-Saharan African region has averaged about 5% per 
year since 2002, and at times exceeded that, as illustrated below. Over the next ten years, 
the GDP growth rate is forecast to average about 6% a year (World Bank, 2015).   
Figure 1: Sub Saharan Africa GDP growth rate (1990-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators  
 
This recent strong performance was mainly the result of a commodity price boom as well as 
some considerable improvements in macro-economic policy. A look at public debt for 
example shows that almost all African countries outperform European Union nations (World 
Bank, 2015). Economic growth has also led to significant human development outcomes. 
Since the early 2000s, Africa’s poverty rate fell from 58% to 43% (World Bank, 2015). 
Furthermore, life expectancy has increased, infant mortality has significantly decreased, real 
income per capita has increased by more than 30%, urbanization has increased, the number 
of people living below the poverty line has decreased and numerous small and medium 
enterprises that provide jobs for the local population have sprung up across the continent 
(World Bank, 2015). Political violence and conflict are widespread and corruption is still 
prevalent in many African countries. Numerous concerns have arisen over the sustainability 

































Many of Africa’s economies are based on natural resources. Some (minerals) are non-
renewable, such as oil, diamonds and gold, while others (fish/timber/soil) are renewable, but 
risk being harvested or used unsustainably. A critical question is, therefore, how much can a 
country spend each year without leaving itself impoverished in the future? Neo-classical 
economic theory has addressed this for over forty years (since the RES symposium edition of 
1974), and it can be argued that economics in general has worried about such issues since the 
time of Malthus. However, in order to shift this from a discussion or an expressed concern, to 
an actual policy, the problem has to be quantified. Although the extraction of their mineral 
resources lowers the resource stock available to future generations of Africans as well as 
causing a permanent reduction in the various economies’ income generating capacity, such a 
loss is not recognised as asset depreciation in the standard national accounting frameworks.  
The appropriate method of introducing such depreciation was extensively discussed in the 
early 1990s, but since the United Nations System of National Accounts of 1993, the discussion 
has died down. The UN opted to use satellite accounts rather than computing a “properly 
defined” national income. However, for purposes of macroeconomic policy, a “proper 
definition” of NDP or NDY, which corrects for resource depletion is needed. Such a “properly 
defined” national income could then become the basis for informed sustainable fiscal policy. 
This thesis demonstrates the process and consequences of such computations in 11 mineral-
based African economies.  
Much of fiscal policy concerns the magnitude of an “acceptable” budget deficit or an 
acceptable rate of growth in national debt. Thus there is a common rule of thumb that a deficit 
equivalent to 3% of GDP is acceptable. The question being asked here is: does it matter 
whether the local resources used in producing the final goods and services that went into that 
GDP were renewable or not? In attempting to answer this question we revisit the issue of 
developing appropriate fiscal frameworks in a mineral rich economy.  
The appropriate fiscal response to resource endowments depends to a great degree on how 
much longer they are expected to last. If many more years are expected, then the concern is 
short run smoothing, i.e. addressing the impacts of resource price fluctuations on the fiscus. 
However, the closer the date at which the resource is expected to be exhausted, the more 
the policy maker's problem becomes long term sustainability, i.e. how to provide for the years 
when the resource is no longer there. 
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Many (developed) countries, following the lead of the 1993 UN System of National Accounts, 
have begun compiling satellite accounts. While the interpretation of these has been 
significantly improved (see the 2008 System of National Accounts; chapters 12 and 29), the 
real message of this data may have been missed by policy makers. This is especially true in 
low-income, mineral-rich African economies which may not have developed such accounts.  
A simple test can be used to reveal the extent to which policy makers have internalised the 
message of the satellite accounts. This would take the relationship between an economy’s 
fiscal deficit before borrowing and its nominal NDY as conventionally recorded, and compare 
it to the relationship between the country’s fiscal deficit and its National Income as calculated 
using the El Serafy method (which follows Hicks’s view of income as the time derivative of 
wealth). Such a comparison would provide a mechanism to test the fragility of economies (or 
the risk their fiscal policies entail in the face of commodity price fluctuations). A more 
complete indicator of an economy’s exposure to fluctuating commodity prices would be the 
relationship between National Debt and Net Domestic Product as computed in these two 
manners. Such tests will underlie the remainder of the paper. 
Literature Review 
The questions “what is income?” and “how sustainable is current consumption?” has 
preoccupied policymakers and economists for a long time. Economic theory has for a long 
time emphasized the “maximise present value criterion” which involves maximising the 
present discounted value of current and future utility from consumption (Arrow et al., 
2004). The optimal level of consumption is derived from solving the optimization problem. 
According to this criterion, consumption today is considered excessive if it is greater than 
the level of present consumption recommended by the optimal consumption path (Arrow et 
al., 2004). A number of key factors such as the discount rate influences the optimal 
consumption path where a higher value for the discount rate means that less weight is given 
to future utility ceteris paribus.1  
                                                             
1 There is no consensus among economists on what is the correct value for the discount rate. Ramsey (1982) contended 
that the suitable value of the discount factor must be zero in a deterministic world. The implication is that the utility of 
future generations should carry the same weight as that of the current generations. However, the use of zero discount 
factor rate was shown to lead to paradoxes and consequently negative social welfare implications (Koopmans, 1960; Lind, 
1982; Portney and Weyant, 1999) 
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An alternative criterion for evaluating whether consumption is excessive or deficient is the 
“sustainability criterion” which underlines the ability of the economy to provide non-
declining welfare or living standards for its citizens. The terms “sustainable” and 
“sustainable development” became very popular after the release of the report by the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987 also known as the 
Brundtland report (named after the chairperson of the commission). The Brundtland 
report’s (WCED, 1987) approach to sustainable growth is broad; “growth that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs and the management of human, natural and financial assets to increase long 
term economic wellbeing”. An economy that experiences rapid expenditure growth funded 
by extraction of mineral resources, and does so without increasing its overall stock of wealth 
by investing in physical and human capital, will not be able to sustain its economic growth in 
the long-run. It also risks sacrificing the wealth of the future generations to finance current 
consumption and in so doing fails to meet the Brundtland definition of sustainability.  
Natural Resource Accounting is based mainly on John Hick’s (1939) definition of ‘sustainable 
income’ and Repetto and Cruz’s (1989) concept of ‘wasting assets’. The sustainable income 
of an economy is the level of consumption that can be sustained forever without 
diminishing the net wealth of the nation (Arrow et al., 2004). It is important to understand 
that this definition does not mean that the stock of natural assets must remain constant, 
but rather that their ability to generate a stream of income for the future stays unchanged. 
With substitution between the different forms of capital (natural, manufactured, human) 
sustainable income may be understood to entail that the total stock of capital and not that 
of the individual components remains the same. 
Unlike with renewable resources such as wood, optimal resource use programs are not easy 
to devise for exhaustible resources such as minerals. This is why their capacity to generate 
the same stream of income and employment for the future generations is reduced with 
depletion due to commercial exploitation. As such it is vital that future generations are 
compensated for the consumption of natural assets by investing some of the resource rents 
in other forms of capital assets (manufactured and human) that are capable of providing the 
same stream of economic gains in the future. 
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Good policymaking needs good information on the capacity of the economy to provide the 
same stream of economic gains in the future. Blades (1989) argued that the United Nation’s 
System of National Accounts then in place gave little aid to resource planners and decision 
makers. Four years later, the UN adopted satellite accounting to mitigate this deficiency2. 
Despite being adopted by the United Nations, satellite accounts have not become universal, 
nor have the policy lessons they offer been fully recognized. Nowhere has this problem been 
clearer than in Africa’s recent growth surge, so much of which was driven by mineral 
commodities. 
Prior to the end of the prolonged commodity boom that led up to the 2008 recession, much 
was made of the rapid growth in GDP demonstrated by many African countries. The 
continent’s rising GDPs were held to be heralds of a new dawn, an up-turn that was reversing 
the downward economic trends that had typified so many of the continent’s economies since 
the end of the colonial era.  
Unfortunately, the rapid fall in commodity prices that ensued as the global recession took 
hold showed the limitations of these high hopes and the weak foundations on which some 
had been based. Although commodity prices have since begun to recover, the lessons of the 
price shocks have not necessarily been built into the fiscal policies of the economies most 
affected. 
In the 1990s, attempts to measure sustainability were popular and numerous studies 
attempted to provide a good measure of sustainability for single countries or a selection of 
countries. These included Repetto et al. (1989) for Indonesia, Cruz and Repetto (1991) for 
Costa Rica, van Tongeren et al. (1993) for Mexico, Bartelmus et al. (1993) for Papua New 
Guinea, Pearce and Atkinson (1993) and Serôa da Motta and Young (1995) for Brazil, and 
Hamilton and Atkinson (1996) for a number of countries.   
The World Bank (1997) carried out the most comprehensive study attempting to provide an 
indicator of weak (i.e. Solow/Hartwick) sustainability. This study covered 103 countries in 
                                                             
2 The trouble is that the satellite accounts do not directly help anyone wanting to use fiscal rules of thumb – the 
information has first to be converted into a properly calculated national income. Not only are satellite accounts not 
universally used; but even when they are in place, they aren’t designed to be used by fiscal policy makers. The information 
may be there, but the way it is presented is not obviously helpful. It is vital to have a measure, which incorporates the 




total, over a 25-year period. Of special interest is Extended Genuine Saving II, which the World 
Bank defines as Gross Saving plus current government spending on education minus fixed 
capital consumption minus resource rents from natural capital extraction minus CO2 
damages. The natural resource rents were computed for items such as copper, silver, tin, hard 
coal, phosphate, oil, zinc, natural gas, iron, bauxite, brown coal, lead, and nickel. The findings 
from this study are that the world as whole and high-income countries in particular pass the 
test of weak sustainability due to high investments in human and manufactured capital. It 
further suggest that entire sub-Saharan African region exhibited signs of unsustainability 
during 1980s and 1990s. Neumayer (2000) critically examined the World Bank (1997) study 
and argued that its conclusions critically depended on its methodology. He stated that there 
were three competing methods for computing natural resource rents, and that the one used 
by the Bank was inferior to at least one of them, namely the El Serafy method.  
Macroeconomic analysis usually focuses on GDP growth as the principal measure of economic 
performance; however, as is now widely established, GDP gives an incomplete picture of an 
economy’s true situation and the welfare of its inhabitants. Other indicators, while harder to 
quantify, can provide valuable information on the state of an economy. This is particularly 
true for countries with a large endowment of mineral resources, as in the case of many sub-
Saharan African countries. GDP and comparable measures describe the value of total 
production in the economy without accounting for changes to the capital stock (which should 
be captured in Net Domestic Product or in National Income). If the national accounting 
aggregates were comprehensively defined, then such changes would also include the 
exhaustion of non-renewable resources, damages to the ecosystem, the accumulation of 
human capital, and new mineral discoveries. In resource-rich economies, these subtleties 
have vital implications for the sustainability of long-term growth and the design of fiscal 
policies. 
The relationship between natural resources and economic success has long confounded 
economists. Despite having considerable natural resources, many African countries are still 
among the poorest nations in the world and have not been able to embark on a sustainable 
long-run economic growth path or to implement the stable fiscal policies necessary to 
continue on such a path. It isn’t just that, as Collier et al. (2010) showed, in low-income 
resource rich countries corruption is often prevalent, literacy levels low , infant mortality rates 
high, and access to water and electricity inadequate, but that even in the development 
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literature the role of natural resources ranges from highly beneficial to deeply undermining. 
While there is no doubt that mineral riches prompted the economic ‘take-offs’ of the USA and 
the dominions, in post-colonial Africa, the weak empiric relationship between resources and 
economic performance suggests that context-specific factors in each country may promote 
its ability or inability to harness its resource wealth.  
Despite efforts towards diversification, the mining sector continues to be the backbone of 
many sub-Saharan economies. This sector is by a number of measures the largest contributor 
to GDP, makes up a considerable amount of government revenues and generates the bulk of 
export earnings. The importance of mineral production to our sample of African economies is 
shown in Figures 2-4 below. In the sample of countries studied, the key driver behind the 
mining sector growth and earnings has largely been oil. There have also been significant 
contributions from ores such as coltan and iron ore, and minerals such as copper, manganese, 
nickel, tin, and zinc. In non-oil producing countries like Botswana and South Africa it has been 
diamonds and platinum (and coal and gold) respectively. The appropriate use of mineral 
resources is of the utmost importance for sustainable growth and development. Countries 
like Botswana, Ghana and South Africa have received widespread praise for the manner in 
which their mineral revenues have been managed (through investment in infrastructure, 
education, health-care and financial assets). To some extent, these countries managed to limit 
the “Dutch Disease” and the “Mineral Curse”. The story is different in countries such as 
Angola, Chad, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria. In these economies, 
resource curse characteristics such as the sluggish growth of non-mining exports, high 
inflation, high unemployment rates and growing income inequality have become the norm.  
Figure 2: Mining as a % of GDP 
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As Figures 2, 3 and 4 show, mineral resources are major contributors to economic activity.  
Figure 3: Mineral Revenues as a % of Government Revenues 
 
Source: United States Geological Survey, IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank 
 
Although government revenues from minerals peaked prior to the global financial crisis and 
declined in its aftermath, they have shown signs of recovery since 2015.  
Figure 4: Mineral Export Revenues as a % of Total Export Revenues 
  
Source: United States Geological Survey, IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank 
The concentration of export earnings in these countries is very high as illustrated in the graph 
above. Such high earnings concentration levels make these countries particularly vulnerable 
to terms of trade shocks. It is a commonplace that commodity prices are more volatile than 
those of manufactured goods are. This outcome is seen in the well documented observation 
that many resource-dependent countries experience more generalised macroeconomic 
volatility and have a strong tendency towards procyclicality (Hausmann and Rigobon, 2003; 
Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009).  
Ramey and Ramey (1995) make the point that such volatility has adverse implications for long-
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landscape in these countries has been changing in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
Figures 2-4 suggests that the peak of the contribution of mining to government revenue and 
the share of GDP accounted for by this sector may have passed. Several factors may be 
responsible for this declining trend:  
• The global financial crisis and its after effects resulted in a massive decline in the 
demand for primary commodities, lowering their prices and leading to the 
abandonment of some mining projects (African Natural Resource Centre, 2016).  
• The mining industry in a number of countries had reached maturity in terms of 
production. Diamond production in Botswana reached its highest level in the mid-
2000s and has since then been in decline. In South Africa, De Beers recently closed its 
largest underground operations at the Kimberly mines after operating there for more 
than 120 years (African Natural Resource Centre, 2016). 
• Lastly, the implementation of policies aimed at diversifying national economies 
resulted in faster growth in the non-mining sector relative to the mining sector 
(African Natural Resource Centre, 2016). 
Nonetheless, the mining sector remains crucial to many sub-Saharan economies.  
It is in this environment that wealth accounting is used to identify and analyse patterns of 
natural capital depletion in Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria and South Africa, and their implications 
for long-term growth and development in these countries. This analysis uses El-Serafy’s 
approach to determine the resource base depreciation because of mining in these countries.  
A focus of the analysis will be the ratio of Adjusted Net Savings to Gross National Income. This 
measure indicates the degree to which the present depletion of natural resources is 
compensated by the reinvestment of natural resource rents in the produced and human 
capital (the essence of Solow/Hartwick weak sustainability). This has significant consequences 
for intergenerational equity in the exploitation of natural resources and welfare.  
 
Research questions and findings 
The primary research questions addressed in this study are:  
i) What is the estimated El-Serafy User cost generated through mineral resource 
extraction in each of the selected sample of sub-Saharan African countries?  
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ii) What is the current adjusted net national savings rates in these countries, and 
what are the implications of these rates for long-term sustainable income growth 
and development?  
iii) How do an economy’s fiscal deficit before borrowing, and its nominal National 
Income as conventionally recorded, compare to the country’s fiscal deficit and its 
true National Income (as calculated using the El Serafy method which follows 
Hicks’s view of income as the time derivative of wealth)? The relationship 
between national debt and Net Domestic Product as computed in the 
aforementioned manners will also be calculated.  
iv) Is the fiscal balance sustainable and what should be the appropriate fiscal policy 
in a low-income economy that is mineral-rich?  
v) What challenges remain and what policy recommendations towards sustainable 
mineral resource revenue management for low-income mineral-rich African 
economies can be suggested? 
The study’s findings reveal a disturbingly poor level of sustainability in several low-income 
mineral resource-rich African countries, namely Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria. The high GDP growth rates experienced 
by these countries (especially prior to the global financial crisis) hide a decrease in the 
overall stock of capital. The depleting stock of natural capital in these countries has not 
been adequately compensated for through investment in human and manufactured capital. 
Instead, the exploitation of mineral resources has created an unsustainable surge in current 
consumption expenditure at the expense of long-term sustained economic growth. Using a 
measure of net national product that is adjusted for mineral resource depletion as an 
anchor for defining the size of an acceptable deficit reveals that GDP typically understates 
the magnitude of a budget deficit and overstates the magnitude of a budget surplus. 
Similarly, national debt when expressed as a percentage of the adjusted measure of national 
income reveals that several of these mineral-rich economies are more vulnerable to 
fluctuating commodity prices than the conventional measures will suggest. 
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Data Sources and Methodology. 
This study uses data collected from the United States Geological Survey, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, National Statistics Agencies and Financial Authorities. The data 
comprises information on GDP, specific mineral rents, sector shares (minerals and mining as 
percentage of GDP), and estimates of yearly mineral production, Budget Deficit, and National 
Debt for a sample of 11 selected sub Saharan African countries for the period 1990-2015. 
These countries are Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Ghana, 
Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria and South Africa.  
Adjusted Net Savings 
Adjusted Net Savings = Gross Savings – Fixed Capital Depreciation + Investment in Human 
Capital – Depletion of Natural Capital – Pollution Damages 
‘Adjusted Net Savings’ is an aggregate that offers policy makers a relatively clear and simple 
indicator of the level of sustainability of an economy’s investment policies. Standard 
measures of savings and investments give incomplete pictures of a nation’s investment 
patterns because they tend to be restricted to physical i.e. man-made/manufactured capital. 
A more inclusive indicator, which incorporates other types of assets, also provides a more 
accurate picture of an economy’s national investment level (Bolt et al. 2002; Naikal, 2015).  
In the current system of national accounts, only physical capital is included within fixed capital 
formation, which is the sole measure of investment and of the overall stock of wealth in the 
national accounts (Bolt et al. 2002; Naikal, 2015). Similarly, the conventional calculation of 
the net savings rate only includes the depreciation of manufactured capital. The ANS 
framework takes the wider view that both human and natural capital should be included 
when assessing the total assets of an economy. From this perspective, any increase in 
educational expenditure or development of labour force skills will increase the value of 
human capital and should therefore be considered an investment. Similarly, the over-
exploitation of a non-renewable resource or the depletion of a mineral resource such as 
diamonds decreases the value of that resource stock remaining in situ. This represents a 
disinvestment in the future productive capacity and welfare of the country.  
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Barbier et al. (1994) describe Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) as a reasonably accurate indicator 
of the degree to which a country passes the Hartwick-Solow rule of weak sustainability. 
However, it is worth noting that although the demands of neo-classical sustainability are 
described as ‘weak’, there are some strong assumptions underlying it. The main assumption 
is that all types of capital (human, physical, natural) are in fact substitutable as production 
inputs. This is a strong assumption even though they are not assumed to be perfect 
substitutes, i.e. to have a straight line isoquant with an infinite elasticity of substitution. 
Rather they are cobb-douglas in shape – i.e. having an elasticity of substitution of one. The 
logic of this is that one just wants to remain on the same isoquant – as a resource become 
scarce its value rises, as another becomes more abundant its prices should fall (Solow, 1974 
and 1986; Pezzey and Toman, 2005). The model market value of the capital needs to be 
remain constant, not the number of physical units. In this way one can move smoothly along 
a curved isoquant and sustain a given level of production. To give a hypothetical example, if 
South Africa’s physical capital stock decreased by about ten percent and human capital 
stock increased by ten percent, the net opportunity cost for future generations is zero. 
Whether or not this is in fact true remains a contentious issue and this study does not 
attempt to settle this debate. The interpretation of ANS as a measure of sustainability is as 
follows: 
Positive ANS: This indicates that the country is investing for future generations by 
accumulating assets (increasing the overall capital stock) that would be used to generate 
income for the economy in the future and enable long-term sustainable economic growth.  
Negative ANS: This indicates that a country is depleting its overall stock of capital as it reduces 
its natural asset base, and its growth path is therefore unsustainable.  
 
Conventional assessments of Adjusted Net Saving use five primary components: 
• Gross Savings: Gross National Income less final consumption expenditure (public and 
private) plus net current transfers.  
• Current Education Expenditure (Human Capital Investment): Standard national 
accounting measures only count as investment the portion of total education 
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expenditure that goes towards fixed capital accumulation, such as the construction of 
schools. The contribution of human capital (knowledge, experience, skills) to 
production is hard to deny but is not considered an asset even within the extended 
definitions of savings (excluding ANS) used. Sub-Saharan economies like most nations 
of the world, increase their human capital stock largely through expenditure on their 
educational system. There exist numerous approaches to measuring investment in 
human capital, which include the cost-based approach, the income-based approach 
and the outcomes approach. It is true that there is no universally accepted method of 
calculating the change in the human capital stock within and across countries 
(Jorgensen and Fraumeni, 1992), although there is a growing consensus that 
conventional savings rates should be adjusted to account for changes in the value of 
human capita. In the context of an Adjusted Net Savings framework that considers 
human capital an integral and indispensable component of the nation’s asset base, 
expenditure on its formation and development cannot be simply classified as 
consumption. This is why recurrent educational expenditure such as salaries and 
wages, books and teaching materials are included in this current educational term. A 
limitation of using this cost-based measure for investment in human capital is that it 
excludes private educational expenditure. One has to acknowledge that accurate data 
on private educational expenditure is difficult to acquire in many developing sub-
Saharan countries. The data on current educational expenditure came from UNESCO 
and the World Bank; and had some missing elements. Where the data set was 
incomplete, the educational expenditure of the preceding year is used to estimate the 
missing data. For example, if there is no educational expenditure data for 2000 but 
there is data for 1999, the ratio of educational expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 
1999 is adjusted by the ratio of GDP to GNI for 2000 to give educational expenditure 
as a percentage of GNI for 2000.  
• Depreciation of Physical Capital: This is the decrease in the value of manufactured or 
fixed capital. The data was taken from the World Bank: World Development 
Indicators. Depreciation data for all the countries in the study were unavailable from 
2009 to 2015 and had to be estimated. Available data on depreciation as a percentage 
of GNI was regressed against the log of GNI per capita. This regression was then used 
to estimated the unavailable depreciation data: Dep/GNI = B0 + B1*Ln(GNI per capita), 
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which in turn was used to calculate the depreciation in nominal terms. There are 
nonetheless some limitations associated with the use of this data. The accounting 
conventions on which depreciation is estimated for tax purposes may be unrelated to 
the actual physical depreciation in a machine or plant and thus lead to inaccurate 
estimates of the depletion of the existing physical capital stock.  
• Damage caused by CO2 emissions: This item expands the notion of an economy’s 
asset base even further to include unpolluted air. The data on estimated CO2 emissions 
is published in the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank. The 
marginal social costs of CO2 emissions are consensus estimates, derived from 
Frankhauser (1994), of global damages to human health, crops and infrastructure 
incurred per metric ton of CO2 emitted over the century that each ton would remain 
in the atmosphere. The social cost is the present value of the yearly flows of damages. 
It is worth noting that under the “polluter pays principle”, emitting countries are 
charged for the global damages imposed by their CO2 emissions. Furthermore, 
countries suffering from climate change are entitled to a clean environment (Hamilton 
and Clemens, 1999). However, there are limitations associated with the use of this 
data. It is established that rising levels of carbon dioxide increase plant growth rates. 
In addition to this is the fact that the impact of rising CO2 levels are not spread evenly 
across the globe. In some areas, expected rainfall is set to rise, and in others, it is set 
to fall. Simply taking an average impact over a continent and imposing this on 
individual counties is not easy to justify and seem somewhat inaccurate.  
• Depreciation of Natural Resources: This covers two elements, namely non-renewable 
(minerals) and renewable resources. The first aspect relevant to this study is the 
reduction in the value of sub-soil mineral deposits through mining. The second is the 
extraction of fish stocks, forests and other biological resources at rates beyond 
sustainable levels. Although satellite accounts for fisheries and forestry are becoming 
more common, they do not give usable data on sustainable yields. For the purpose of 
this analysis, renewable resources are excluded and the emphasis is specifically on 
mineral resources.  
Despite the fact that mineral resource extraction lowers the stock available to future 
generations, the standard income measures fail to classify it as a cost of production. 
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That it is an opportunity cost was recognised Hotelling (1932), but he did not indicate 
how it should be estimated. At present there are three competing methods for 
computing resource rents: the World Bank’s (NPV), El-Serafy’s and Repetto’s.  
The World Bank’s Method for Computing Resource Rents 
In this method, resource rents are measured as the market value of the extracted resource 
less the average extraction cost. In theory, the net price should be computed as market price 
less marginal extraction cost. However, since such marginal cost are difficult to estimate, the 
World Bank has adopted the average extraction cost as a proxy. The procedure is used for all 
types of mineral resources including crude oil, base metals, precious metals and gemstones. 
The formula for resource rents is given below: 
(𝑷 − 𝑨𝑪) ∙ 𝑹 
                                                              Source: Neumayer (2000) 
• P is the resource price 
• AC is average cost 
• R is resource depletion 
Rents are usually valued at total Hotelling rent, albeit calculated using the more available 
average cost as a proxy for the theoretically correct marginal cost, i.e the resource rent over 
any time period will be the net price of the resource (P - AC) multiplied by the amount 
produced (R). The only negative externalities considered are CO2 emissions which are valued 
at 20 US$ per metric tonne of carbon (Fankhauser, 1994).  
From the formula, it is clear that this method does not account for resource discoveries. 
However, given that exploration expenditure tend to be recorded under investment 
expenditure (rather than as production costs of the mining sector) in standard national 
accounting there may be no need to correct for resource discoveries (World Bank, 1997). 
The Repetto (Net Price) Method for Computing Resource Rents 
Also called the net price method, this procedure for computing resource rents was postulated 
by Repetto (1988). He follows Hotelling (1932) in treating the rent per unit of production as 
(P-MC), and in recognizing that the terminal point in the dynamic programming problem is 
set by the financially feasible amount of the resource that can be profitably extracted. This 
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method assumes that all net revenue from mining is ascribed to the depletion of the ore body 
and none of it is ascribed to value added by other factors of production i.e. the net profit from 
resource extraction represents total hotelling rents (Crowards, 1996). This  implicitly assumes 
that marginal costs from resource extraction remain constant. Thus, to maximise resource 
rents, increases in rent per unit as the stock size decreases will be set equal to the discount 
rate (Crowards, 1996). The resource rent formula is specified as  
(𝑷 −𝑴𝑪) ∙ (𝑹 − 𝑫) 
                                                            Source: Neumayer (2000) 
• P is the resource price 
• MC is marginal cost 
• R is annual production 
• D is resource discoveries 
This approach is consistent with national accounting practices and theoretical growth models 
such as Hartwick (1990) in that it allows for the calculation of a capital consumption allowance 
that is rooted in a net product measure. Levin (1991) and Landefeld & Hines (1985) 
recommend this measure and take it further to develop operational accounting procedures 
for measuring depreciation using the net price method. However, it must be noted that there 
is still a lot of controversy surrounding the treatment of resource discoveries.  
Repetto’s method is not without its critics. Despite its theoretical correctness, one of these is 
the use of (constant) marginal cost rather than average cost. Hartwick (1990) objects that as 
long as marginal cost are assumed to be constant (instead of increasing) as the resource stock 
becomes depleted, the estimated extraction costs will tend to exceed the ‘true extraction 
costs’ resulting in an overestimation of the depreciation term. A second is that new resource 
discoveries and the subsequent asset revaluations can cause sudden and large fluctuations in 
Adjusted Net National Product (Serôa da Motta and Young, 1995). Finally, El Serafy (1989) 
and Neumayer (2000) observe that with the net price method, resource depreciation cancels 
out the income generated by mining. All the receipts from production are considered capital 
consumption and as such, net income is zero. With respect to national income, it is as though 
the mineral never existed. This interpretation is misleading and is the reason that El Serafy 
based his approach on the Hicksian definition of income.  
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The El Serafy (User cost) Method for Computing Resource Rents 
This method follows the Hicks’s basic view that income is the time derivative of wealth3. El 
Serafy (1989) proposes that the proceeds from current resource extraction be split into two 
components:  
• True income which is the value added from mining; 
• A residual term equal to the amount that would have to be reinvested at the 
prevailing interest rate in order to generate a perpetual income stream equal to 
the true income. 
In this analysis, the ‘El Serafy’ method will be used to compute resource rents for the eleven 
countries so as to ascertain whether they meet the preconditions for weak sustainability, or 
are unsustainable, and to formulate the appropriate policy recommendations.  
To calculate the User cost for resource depletion according to the El Serafy method, four 
different terms are needed: 
• P-AC (net price of the resource); 
• R, Production (Resource Depletion); 
• r, the real discount rate (the discount rate used in this analysis is 4% p.a.); 
• n, the number of years of reserves remaining at current production rates and 
assuming current extraction technologies (reserves to production ratio). 
It is important to calculate resource rents for each category of mineral resource. Resource 
rents can be defined broadly as Unit Rents × Production where the Unit Rents = Unit Price – 
Unit Cost. The El-Serafy formula for User cost can be expressed as: 




Source: Neumayer (2000) 
                                                             
3Hicks (1939) provided a theoretical definition of income and discussed how government agencies and economists 
approximate this definition. Hicks defined income as the maximum amount that can be consumed in a given period 
without decreasing real wealth. He further engaged in the discussion of three approximations to this central definition. The 
first approximation defines income as the maximum amount that can be spent on consumption while keeping nominal 
wealth constant. The second defines income as the maximum amount that an individual can consume in a given period (t) 
and still expect to consume the same amount in all subsequent periods (t+n). The third approximation defines income as 
the maximum amount that individuals can consume in a given period and still expect to consume the same amount in real 
terms in the future.  
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It may be worth discussing the derivation of the formula above in order to understand 
conceptually and theoretically how this method differs from others used to estimate resource 
rents.  
Assuming that resource receipts accrue at the end of the period, the value of a resource stock 
at the start of the period can be expressed as:  
Wo = [R1(P1-C1)/(1+r)} + {R2(P2-C2)/(1+r)2} +……………..+ {RT(PT-CT)/(1+r)T}  
       = ∑ {4567 Rt(Pt-Ct)/(1+r)t}                                                                                                         (1) 
Let V represent a constant income payment which will be replicated ad infinitum. The 
resulting stream’s present value at the start of the period is X0:i.e. 
Xo = V/(1+r) + V/(1+r)2 + V/(1+r)3 + X/(1+r)4 +……… 
      =∑ 𝑉9567 /(1+r)t                                                                                                                                   (2)                                                                                                         
Now assuming that Rt = R, Pt = P and Ct = C for all t and using N = R (P-C) for net receipts and 
d=1/(1+r), expression (1) and (2) can be rewritten as  
Wo = N [d + d2 + d3 + d4 +……..+ dT]                                                                                          (3) 
Xo = V [d + d2 + d3 + d4 +……...]                                                                                                   (4) 
Note that for r > 0 this implies d < 1 
Multiplying the left hand and right hand side of equations (3) and (4) by the term d gives 
dWo = N [d2 + d3 + d4 + d5 +……...+ dT+1]                                                                                (5) 
and subtracting (5) from equation (3) gives W0 - dWo = N[d – dT+1] so that                                          
W0 = N [d –dT+1]/[1-d]                                                                                                   (6) 
Rewriting equation (4) for a finite time horizon n gives X’0 = V [d + d2 +…..+ dn] where n is 
an arbitrary real finite number. Proceeding as before gives X’0 = V [d – dn+1]/(1-d); letting 
n→∞ makes the term dn+1 vanish so that X = 𝐥𝐢𝐦
𝒏→9
(𝑿?) = dV/ [1-d] which is the present 
value of a constant infinite income stream.  
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Assuming a perfectly competitive economy, if the constant infinite income stream depends 
solely on the ownership of the mineral stock, then the present value of the infinite income 
stream must be equal to the value of the mine at the start of the period: W0 = X0 
Using equation (5) and (6) gives N [d – d T+1]/[1-d] = dV/[1-d]. Collecting like terms together 
and substituting 1/(1+r) for d gives N – V = N/(1+r)T.  
Finally by substituting N = R(P–C) one gets R(P–C) – X = R(P–C)/(1+r)T  and the expression 
for the El-Serafy User cost (Depreciation): DN = R(P-C)/(1+r)T. 
This is an estimate of the total Hotelling Rent (only an estimate, since Hotelling used marginal 
rather than average extraction cost) that the resource could provide. Following Keynes’s 
terminology, it is called the User cost of resource depletion as it indicates the share of 
resource receipts that should be considered as capital depreciation. 4 
With this method, an explicit correction term for resource discoveries is not needed because 
discoveries and new technologies that affect effective reserves enter the formula via changes 
to n, and the formula is recalculated for each year. 
The logic behind the formula for the El Serafy method is that sustainability need not require 
that all resource rent be invested (as Hartwick (1997) suggested) but that a portion can be 
consumed. While the earnings from the resource stock will end at some finite point, 
sustainable income by definition must last forever. Therefore, a finite cash flow has to be 
converted into an infinite one. Sustainable income is that part of resource receipts which if 
received infinitely would have a present value just equal to the present value of the finite 
stream of resource receipts over the lifetime of the resource. That is if each year’s resource 
rents were used to purchase an infinitely long-lasting annuity, sustainable income would be 
the annual pay out from that annuity. 
The User cost or depreciation term is the difference between the net resource receipts and 
sustainable income. This method thus leads to a fairly simple rule for calculating the 
                                                             
4Keynes (1936) used the term in relation to capital and defined it as the maximum net value of the capital equipment if it 
had been conserved rather than being used. The application of User cost in the context of mining was placed in the 
appendix to Ch6 of the GT. It grew in popularity and become commonly used in studies analyzing of exhaustible resource. 
Examples of such studies include Schramm, 1986. 
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depreciation term for a mineral resource as User cost, and the associated real income from 
resource extraction.  
An advantage of using the El Serafy method is that it does not presume efficient resource 
pricing, i.e resource rent growing at the rate of interest according to Hotelling’s rule. This is 
because the El-Serafy method does not depend on an optimisation model. It is an “after the 
fact” approach thus making it more flexible than competing resource rent calculation 
methods (World Bank, 2013). Consequently, future resource receipts have to be discounted 
and the El Serafy method requires the selection of a discount rate r.  
For any given asset lifetime, the choice of interest rate is of significant importance. If the 
remaining lifetime of the mineral resource, n, or the discount rate, r, is quite small, then User 
cost value will be relatively large. With a long resource extraction horizon and high discount 
rate, nearly all net receipts count as income. 
Butterfield (1992) argues that the El Serafy approach confuses an “income measure” with a 
“product measure” by asserting that “User cost” does not measure “natural capital 
consumption” thereby implying that gross product and not net product should be adjusted. 
In so doing, the El Serafy method violates the income-product identity. The counter-argument 
to this is that an unadjusted GDP should be calculated following the standard accounting 
procedures and GDP adjusted with User cost should also be computed and the latter will serve 
as a more reliable measure of sustainable income (Harris & Fraser, 2002).  
The second criticism of this method is that its assumption that unit rents and extraction levels 
remain constant over time is unrealistic. This assumption means that User cost estimates 
would stay fixed while extraction cost and prices vary over time (Dasgupta, 1995). Harris and 
Fraser (2002) counter argue that El Serafy’s approach, like other methods, aims to generate 
some approximation to the true measure. The procedure is constantly updated in each 
accounting period so that the set of assumptions is not strictly followed to over time.  
Computing resource rents according to the ‘El Serafy’-method 





Table 1: Share of Single Mineral Resources as a percentage of Total Resource Rents 
Share of Crude Oil & Natural Gas (% of Rents) 1990-1999 2000-2008 2009-2015 
Angola 99.4 97.5 96.2 
Cameroon 70.0 60.3 52.1 
Chad 0.0 98.5 97.2 
Congo Brazzaville 90.3 97.5 98.9 
Equatorial Guinea                                                                         95.0 96.0 97.0 
Gabon 90.3 87.8 85.4 
Ghana 0.0 0.2 29.4 
Mauritania 0.0 9.6 19.9 
Nigeria                                                                            99.8 99.6 95.2 
Share of Iron Ore (% of Rents) 
   
Mauritania 100 90.2 57.6 
Share of Gold (% of Rents)    
Ghana 100 95.9 70.3 
Mauritania 0.0 0.1 22.5 
South Africa 29.9 16.2 17.5 
Share of Coal (% of Rents)    
South Africa  57.6 35.3 57.5 
Share of Platinium (% of Rents)    
South Africa 12.5 48.1 24.7 
Share of Diamonds ( % of Rents) 
   
Angola                                                     0.0 2.4 3.8 
Botswana 90.2 93.3 96.7 
Diamonds 0.0 3.8 0.3 
South Africa 0.0 0.3 0.2 
Source: United States Geological Survey, IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank 
 
Table 1 shows that for Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon and Nigeria the dominant resource is oil & natural gas. For Botswana the dominant 
resource is diamonds, Ghana has gold and Mauritania is dominated by iron-ore extraction. 
South Africa has the most diversified mineral base in the sense that it is not heavily reliant on 
any particular one.  
Before moving on to the analysis, it is important to acknowledge a number of methodological 
issues. First, data limitations affect the reliability of the analysis for mineral resources. For 
example, Gabon ranked as the fourth largest world producer of manganese and Cameroon 
the seventh largest producer of pumice in 2014 (John, 2014; Loyd, 2014). Nigeria, in addition 
to producing oil and natural gas, also produced and exported other minerals, such as tantalum 
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and nickel. Even though their contribution is undeniable, these minerals could not be in the 
calculations because the data was unreliable or deficient. The second and perhaps most 
important issue is that the results significantly underestimate the total stock of wealth for our 
sample of countries as other categories of natural capital such forests and agricultural land 
are excluded from the analysis due to data unreliability and unavailability. In the remainder 
of this paper, the term natural resources will be used interchangeably with mineral resources. 
Results 
After the estimates of the User cost from mineral resource extraction have been calculated, 
Adjusted Net Savings are estimated for the sample of 11 countries and the results illustrated 
in the following graphs  
Figure 5: Angola Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
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Figure 6: Botswana Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculation 
 
Figure 7: Cameroon Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
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Figure 8: Chad Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
Source: Author’s Own Calculation 
 
Figure 9: Congo, Rep Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
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Figure 10: Equatorial Guinea Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-
2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculation 
Figure 11: Gabon Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
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Figure 12: Ghana Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
Source: Author’s Own Calculation 
Figure 13: Mauritania Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
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Figure 14: Nigeria Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculation 
Figure 15: South Africa Adjusted Net Savings (% GNI) & Gross National Savings (% GNI) 1990-2015 
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The figures above indicate that Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritania and South 
Africa experienced a consistently positive gross savings rate. This did not necessarily translate 
into persistently positive Adjusted Net Savings. On the other hand, Angola, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria experienced a few years of negative gross savings rate. 
The countries with high reserves to production ratios (n) rarely display negative ANS. Such 
appears to be the case for Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana and South Africa. This is not surprising 
because a high n decreases the User cost from mineral depletion as a smaller share of the 
resource stock is consumed, assuming a constant production level.  
For Mauritania and Nigeria, the ANS rates seem to move quite closely with the GS rates, but 
there are a number of years where the GS rate is positive but ANS rate is negative. In the case 
of Angola, Chad, Congo and Equatorial Guinea, the figures show that there is a large gap 
between their GS and ANS. These countries are also similar in that there are several years 
where the GS rate is positive but the ANS rate is negative to a considerable degree. An 
explanation for this is the fact that they all have low reserves to production ratios. 
Furthermore, during the price commodity boom their production increased considerably but 
the size of their reserves stayed constant and in some cases declined, resulting in a fall of their 
reserves to production ratio (n). Thus, the estimated User cost from resource depletion was 
high. Asheim (1994) and Pezzey and Withagen (1995) showed that a positive ANS is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for weak sustainability. However, persistently negative 
rates of ANS must lead to declining future welfare. If a persistent negative ANS rate is a 
relatively good indicator of unsustainability, there is a need for some formal definition of this. 
Following Neumayer (2000) but altering his approach slightly, we define a persistently 
negative savings rate as having experienced negative ANS rates for more than seven years for 
the period 1990-2015 though not necessarily consecutively. 
Out of maximum of 25 possible years, the frequency of persistently negative adjusted savings 





Table 2: Frequency of persistently negative saving rates 
Country Number of Years 
Botswana 0 Years  
Ghana, Mauritania 1-3 Years 
Cameroon, South-Africa 4-6 Years 
Gabon, Nigeria 7-9 Years 
Angola, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea >=10 Years 
 Source: Author’s Own Calculations.  
From Table 2, we can conclude that six out of the eleven countries in this study have 
experienced persistently negative savings and can therefore be classified as weakly 
unsustainable. The persistence of negative ANS for Angola, Chad, Congo Brazzaville and 
Equatorial Guinea certainly highlights the need for better resource management in the future. 
These countries have not been able to capitalize on the considerable opportunities given to 
them through their natural resource endowments to build up and maintain their physical and 
human stock of capital in exchange for the exhaustion of their stock of natural capital. 
Botswana, on the other hand, has enjoyed consistently positive Adjusted Net Savings; with its 
high ratios of reserves to production, there seems little indication of unsustainability. The 
widening of the gap in recent years between GS and ANS in Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana and 
Nigeria suggests that some amount of the national wealth that is consumed is in excess of 
what should be the case under efficient resource rent management as suggested by El Serafy 
User cost approach.  
Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to define sustainability purely in terms of savings. The crucial 
factor in determining sustainability is investment and not savings (Neumayer, 2000). Savings 
equals investment only in the special case where government expenditure is zero and there 
is no economy in the world where this is the case. If there are no taxes and government 
expenditure is non-zero then savings is the sum of investments and government expenditure. 
With taxes present in the economy, savings equals investments plus government expenditure 
plus taxes.  
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A simple test can be used to reveals why a “proper definition” National Income which corrects 
for resource depletion is needed for low-income resource-rich economies. This looks at the 
relationship between an economy’s fiscal deficit before borrowing and its nominal NY as 
conventionally recorded, and compares it to the relationship between the country’s fiscal 
deficit and its National Income as calculated using the El Serafy method. A more complete 
indicator of an economy’s exposure to fluctuating commodity prices could be the relationship 
between national debt and Net Domestic Product as computed in these two manners. Using 
a measure of net national product that adjust for mineral depletion as an anchor for defining 
the size of an acceptable deficit reveals that GDP typically understates the true magnitude of 
a budget deficit and overstates the true magnitude of a budget surplus. Similarly, national 
debt when expressed as a percentage of the adjusted net national income reveals that several 
mineral-rich economies are more vulnerable to fluctuating commodity prices than the 
conventional measures would suggest (refer to Appendix 9 for the graphs). Thus, the common 
rule of thumb that a fiscal deficit equivalent to 3% of GDP or a debt to GDP ratio that does 
not exceed 60% is acceptable may lead to misjudgements of the true state of the economy. 
Consequently, the economic policies implemented by the governments in these countries 
may be flawed and lead to sub-optimal outcomes for current and future generations. In the 
next section, which discusses fiscal policy in the context of a mineral-based economy, we 
construct a number of first order approximation measures that focus on investments and 
should provide an indication of the fiscal fragility of these economies.  
What is the appropriate Fiscal Policy in low-income resource-rich African countries?  
Mineral economies are unique and different from non-mineral economies because of their 
reliance on mineral revenues for budget stability and their dependence on the mining sector 
to boost sustainable economic development and growth. Despite this basic similarity, there 
are significant variations between resource-rich countries, ranging from the relative 
magnitude of the resources’ contribution to the economy, the maturity of the resource 
sector, its ownership and taxation structure, the government's financial position and the size 
of the reserves. The last point may be the most important because it determines the focus of 
fiscal policy. The first practical problem with reserves is how to appropriately define them. 
Numerous approaches has been used over time, but the one which is clearly defined and 
internationally understood is that used by U.S. Government’s Bureau of Mines. It provides the 
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following definitions: “reserves” are the known amounts of a mineral that can be profitably 
produced at current prices and with the current level of technology (Omayra et al., 2013). New 
discoveries and new technologies (as well as changes in demand that are reflected by changes 
in the price of the product) can influence the extent of economic reserves. These are the 
stocks of the resource sometimes known as its “proven reserves”. As the degree of knowledge 
of the precise dimensions of the ore body diminishes, one moves to the terms “indicated 
reserves” and then “inferred reserves”. The extent of the proven reserve of a mineral may be 
influenced in other ways than by demand and supply. For example, a tax system which 
imposes a royalty on proven but unexploited reserves leaves miners with an incentive not to 
confirm reserves that are believed to exist. In Zambia, the government estimates that about 
$2 billion of possible mining tax revenue is lost through tax avoidance (International Monetary 
Fund, 2017).  
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It follows then that the appropriate fiscal response to resource endowments depends to a 
great degree on how much longer they are expected to last (the size of the reserves properly 
defined). The length of time remaining to resource depletion will determine whether the 
focus will be on short-run smoothing or long-term sustainability, as previously mentioned. 
Identified, Demonstrated, Inferred,  
Measured, Indicated 
 
Unidentified, Hypothetical, Speculative 
 
Proven Reserves Measured 
Reserves 
 
Paramarginal or Conditional Reserves.  
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Numerous theorists have identified a combination of concerns about short-run and long-term 
strategies. Short-run price volatility in natural resource markets has been identified by Auty 
(1997, 2000 and 2004), Barnett and Ossowski (2003), Cashin et al. (2003), Eifert et al. (2003), 
Collier (2010 and 2012), Daniel et al. (2013), Geiregat and Yang (2013). Long term 
sustainability has mainly been a concern of weak sustainability theorists such as Solow (1974, 
1986) and Hartwick (1977).  
A reasonable estimate of whether existing reserves are likely to last long is crucial and should 
be at the core of fiscal policy frameworks in mineral-based economies. The attraction of the 
El Serafy method is that it incorporates the vital element of a resource extraction horizon in 
the computation of resource rents and how much of it is safe to consume. If the remaining 
lifetime of the mineral resource n is quite small, then User cost value will consequently be 
relatively large. With a long resource extraction horizon, nearly all net receipts count as 
income, which allows the government to invest these proceeds into a sinking fund that will 
smooth the fiscus. 
Although sustainability is an important concern for all countries, adjusting fiscal policy to a 
future environment without mineral resources is a less immediate concern for those 
economies with long resource horizons. The main short-run concern for these economies 
usually involves managing the volatility of resource revenues caused by price fluctuations. On 
the other hand, countries with shorter resource horizons need to focus more immediately on 
how government expenditure can be sustained once resource revenues are exhausted. It 
follows that managing the volatility in resource prices should be the most important objective 
of fiscal policy in countries that rely heavily on the revenues generated from the extraction of 
natural resources and have a long resource horizon. For countries with shorter resource 
horizons and larger uncertainties about production volumes, an alternative approach to 
control for resource price volatility is needed (Barnett and Ossowski, 2003). The optimal level 
of the non-resource fiscal balance should be based on the individual economy’s capacity to 
absorb revenues without this leading to high inflation and a large current account deficit 
(Daniel et al., 2013). A major benefit of this approach is that it provides a direct link to fiscal 
sustainability by setting a target for the non-resource fiscal balance that can be sustained 
even after resource revenues get depleted (Daniel et al., 2013). Fiscal policy in this scenario 
is very similar to that which a country reliant on foreign aid should plan for when it is 
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anticipated that aid will stop in the medium to long term. In the event that resource revenues 
are higher than budgeted, the excess must be saved rather than spent. For the same reason, 
the government can draw down on its financial assets when budgeted revenues fall short of 
what is expected. Examples of countries that implement such fiscal frameworks include 
Norway, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea.  
One option to ensure fiscal sustainability is the “annuity approach”. This entails saving all 
resource revenues. Expenditure is then confined to the interest generated from these savings. 
These saved resource revenues are commonly referred to as stabilisation or sovereign wealth 
funds. These funds should complement fiscal policy rather than trying to substitute it; their 
funding should come from budget surpluses and not borrowing. Consequently, resource 
funds should not be granted autonomous spending authority. They can be allowed to exercise 
different mandates such as providing a means to carry out intergenerational savings or 
stabilizing government spending. Ideally, countries with very poor institutional capacity 
should possess just one resource fund as the management of several resource funds is likely 
to be very difficult. Norway provides an example of the successful implementation of this 
approach. Each year the government budget is credited with approximately 4% of the value 
of saved oil revenues. Although this approach has worked well in Norway, a number of 
academic scholars have argued that it is unlikely to be successful for developing countries 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa which suffer from capital scarcity and large infrastructure 
investment needs. According to Collier (2012) the classical sovereign wealth fund is 
inappropriate for “poor countries” because in capital inadequate economies it is 
inappropriate to accumulate long-term foreign investments and the central objective should 
be to develop domestic infrastructure. Similarly, Van der Ploeg (2009) argued that an 
international sovereign wealth fund is not appropriate for a capital scarce country as it is too 
conservative, in that it prevents any short-term increases in consumption. This criticism is 
grounded on the fact that the sovereign wealth fund model is based on the permanent 
income hypothesis (developed by Milton Friedman 1957) which is one of the key foundations 
of modern-day consumption theory. Sovereign wealth funds perform a wide-ranging set of 
functions and exist in some of the world’s richest countries (e.g., Canada, Norway, and the 
United States) as well as in some of the poorest (e.g. Nigeria and Ghana).  
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An alternative strategy to the annuity approach is to use the proceeds from the sale of mineral 
resources to purchase manufactured capital and improve the socio–economic conditions of 
the citizens (Geiregat and Yang, 2013; Helbling, 2013). The rate of return of productive 
government expenditure is likely to be much higher for countries with significant 
infrastructure and human capital needs compared to the rate of return on financial assets 
(Daniel et al., 2013). An increase in government expenditure finance by resource revenues on 
high-quality public infrastructure is very likely to boost economic growth and decrease the 
reliance of the economy on resource revenues for fiscal stimulus. It is quite clear that such an 
outcome depends heavily on the effectiveness of public spending. Should public spending be 
poorly managed, it is obvious that the welfare of future generations will be seriously 
compromised.  
In order to ensure that a state’s expenditure matches its long-term average revenues, the 
fiscal authorities can implement rules that account for yearly fluctuations in resource prices. 
Such smoothing in estimating the structural proceeds that can be expected in an average year 
allows the authorities to determine how much of the proceeds can be safely spent through 
the annual budget. It is still possible that structural revenues will change very sharply 
following unexpected price changes (Daniel et al, 2013).  
The Sustainability of the Budget 
There is consensus that resource-rich countries must invest the revenues from the 
exploitation of mineral resources into increasing their stock of wealth by accumulating other 
assets. These other assets (human, financial and manufactured capital) will then help 
generate income for the economy in the future when the minerals resource is exhausted.  
The Hartwick-Solow Rule developed by Hartwick (1977) and Solow (1974, 1986) offers a rule 
of thumb for assessing sustainability in resource-rich countries. This states that a non-
declining level of consumption can be sustained if the value of investments equals the value 
of rents on extracted resources at each point in time.  
Few African countries have adopted and implemented mineral revenue policy management 
that follows this approach. Botswana is usually praised for its good mineral revenue 
management and asset accumulation policies. Their finance policy framework stipulates that 
mineral revenues should be used to finance investment in other types of capital (African 
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Natural Resource Centre, 2016). This is to ensure that the country’s asset base does not 
diminish and to provide the basis for alternative income-generating streams or mechanisms 
when the mineral resource becomes exhausted. The corollary from the asset-preservation 
principle is that non-investment (recurrent) expenditure must be financed from non-mineral 
sources. In Botswana mineral revenues are not separated from the rest of the budget but 
rather paid in to a Sinking Fund. The proceeds from the fund are used to smooth the fiscal 
balance when diamond prices fluctuate adversely.  
Historically, the implementation of the asset-replacement principle has been monitored 
through the Sustainable Budget Index, defined as the ratio of recurrent spending to non-
mineral revenues. An SBI value of less than one suggest that the proceeds from the extraction 
of mineral resources is being spent on public investment or saved and then interpreted as 
(weakly) sustainable. An SBI value greater than one indicates that recurrent expenditure is 
being (partly) financed from mineral revenues, which is then interpreted as (weakly) 
unsustainable. In calculating the SBI, government expenditure is adjusted so that current 
educational and health spending is classified as investment in human capital and excluded 
from recurrent spending. We extend the SBI measure to the other mineral economies to get 
a first-order approximation of fiscal sustainability following Hartwick’s rule: 
Figure 16a: Sustainable Budget Index: 2000-2007 
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Figure 16b: Sustainable Budget Index: 2008-2015 
Source: Authors Own Calculations based on data from National Financial Authorities 
The first-order approximation of the Hartwick-Solow rule to the sample of countries yields 
interesting results. The SBI for most countries has been greater than one, especially in Angola 
(13 years), Mauritania (12 years), Congo (12 years) and Equatorial Guinea (12 years). Chad (2 
years) and Cameroon (7 years) surprisingly display relatively low signs of budget 
unsustainability. Botswana stands out as being highly sustainable with 0 years. Ghana and 
South Africa are mid-table with 4 years each. Marginal increases in the share of health and 
education in total expenditure is an important explanation of why the SBI has been on average 
below one in the “weakly sustainable economies”. Even though the Hartwick-Solow rule 
provides an easy rule of thumb, it is certainly not optimal for a low-income mineral-based 
economy. Collier and Venables (2008) show that the optimal growth path for these countries 
involves setting aside some of the resource rents for consumption. Their study however does 
not specify what should be the optimal consumption/investment ratio of resource rents. This 
leads us back to the El Serafy method and the beauty of its underlying logic. According to El 
Serafy, sustainability need not require that all resource rent be invested but that a portion 
can be consumed. While the earnings from the resource stock will end at some finite point in 
the future, sustainable income by definition must last forever. Thus, sustainable income is 
that part of resource receipts which if received infinitely would have a present value just equal 
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Given that we have already calculated the User cost from mineral extraction, we can estimate 
the sustainable income from resource rent extraction, which is the difference between total 
resource rents and User cost. We construct a relatively simple indicator called the Adjusted 
Sustainable Budget Index to test the fragility of fiscal policies in these economies. This simple 
test can be used to reveal the extent to which policy makers have internalised the message 
of the satellite accounts (where these accounts have been constructed) or failed to derive 
possible insights due to the absence of these satellite (mineral) accounts. The Adjusted 
Sustainable Budget Index is defined as the ratio of net investment expenditure to sustainable 
income as defined using the El Serafy method (which follows Hicks’s view of income as the 
time derivative of wealth). An ASBI value greater than one suggest that the sustainable 
portion of resource rents is invested in other assets, human or physical, and thus is 
interpreted as (weakly) sustainable. An ASBI value of less than one indicates that current 
consumption is being (partly) financed from sustainable income which is then interpreted as 
(weakly) unsustainable. As with the calculation of the SBI, government expenditure is 
adjusted so that current educational and health spending is classified as investment in human 
capital and excluded from current consumption expenditure.  
Figure 17a: Adjusted Sustainable Budget Index: 2000-2007 
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Figure 17b: Adjusted Sustainable Budget Index: 2008-2015 
 
Source: Authors Own Calculations based on data from National Financial Authorities 
Prior to the global financial crisis, several economies had ASBI values below one and thus 
appeared to display signs of budget unsustainability. These “high risk” countries included 
Angola (8 years), Congo (8 years), Nigeria (8 years), South Africa (8 years), Equatorial Guinea 
(7 years), Gabon (6 years) and Chad (4 years). There was a declining trend in Ghana’s ASBI but 
it never dropped below one. Cameroon did not display any clear trends as the ASBI values 
fluctuated a little but fell below one only twice. On the other hand, Botswana and Mauritania 
displayed no signs of budget unsustainability either before or after the global financial crisis. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the ASBI of the “high risk” economies 
appears to display an increasing trend. This may be attributed to the fall in mineral commodity 
prices and the slow-down in economic growth that pushed the governments of most of these 
countries to reduce their current consumption expenditure, diversify their exports base and 
manage their resources rents more appropriately. The unexpected finding from this analysis 
is the fact that Botswana and South Africa display diametrically opposite trends when these 
economies arguably have better fiscal frameworks relative to the rest of their mineral-
exporting peers. We would expect these two economies to display not exact but similar 
trends. We suspect that the El Serafy User cost term for mineral resource extraction in South 
Africa may have been underestimated. This would have inflated the estimated sustainable 















Gabon Ghana Mauritania Nigeria South
Africa
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
44 
 
The ASBI also has its limitations. Firstly, it aggregates capital (physical and human) and does 
not provide an indication of the distribution of sustainable income expenditure between the 
different types of capital. The productivity of the different types of capital and consequently 
their economic impact is different at specific periods for these economies. South Africa suffers 
from a shortage of highly skilled workers and experiences (youth) unemployment although it 
is among the top countries with a high level of human capital investment.  
Discussion and Policy Implications 
The economic performance of resource-rich African countries has not been consistent and to 
some extent can be considered disappointing as many struggled to manage windfall gains 
from a primary commodities price boom efficiently. A number of theories have been 
developed to explain the failure of mineral-rich economies to capitalize on their natural 
resource endowments and achieve long-term sustainable growth and development. The first 
factor is the quality of institutions, which in turn affect the quality of the economic policies 
that tend to be put in place (Auty, 1997). The fact that resource-poor countries typically 
outperform resource-rich countries seems to be a robust finding. Robinson et al. (2006) 
produced one of the most comprehensive studies on the relationship between an abundance 
of resource revenues, political accountability and the quality of institutions in the economy. 
Their argument and empirical evidence suggest that governments that do not have to 
introduce socially tolerable and consistent systems of taxation but can instead finance 
themselves through resource revenues have reduced incentives to be accountable and 
responsive to their citizens. Consequently, they do not have a stake in the development of a 
thriving market-based, non-resource economy that is otherwise required to establish a 
taxable economic base and secure the fiscal sustainability of the state. Table 3 shows that 
with the exception of Botswana and South Africa, all the countries in this study had very poor 
scores for the index of institutional quality and furthermore share other adverse institutional 
features, as illustrated in table 3 (World Bank, 2015). In contrast, governments in non-
resource countries have an incentive to promote the development of a market-based 
economy as it generates a multitude of corporate and individual taxpayers, providing a steady 
and stable source of revenue for the state. Auty (1997) analysed the economic and 
institutional performance of resource-deficient and resource-rich countries and his findings 
are in line with those of Robinson et al. 
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In the Robinson et al. (2006) model, the existence of resources and associated rents increases 
the utility of holding political power for too long. As a result, political horizons across a range 
of policy issues are short-sighted and sub-optimal from a social welfare perspective. Most of 
the resource revenues are directed towards the single purpose of keeping political power. 
One manifestation of this is a bloated public sector, which has a stake in keeping the status 
quo and is paid off through the rents emanating from the resource sector. Unsurprisingly, a 
number of prominent studies (Auty, 1997 and 2004; Collier, 2010) have found a strong 
evidence that resource abundance is associated with higher levels of corruption. Seven out of 
eleven countries, namely Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and 
Nigeria in our study, rank among the most corrupt in the world according to the World Bank’s 
Governance Quality Index (2015). Secondly, mineral commodity prices tend to be highly 
volatile which renders mineral economies fragile due to their heavy reliance on them. 
Cairncross (1962) and Prebisch (1964) were among the first to highlight the adverse impact 
of primary commodity prices on the economies of exporting countries.  
The rent-seeking and broader political economy literature on the resource curse helps explain 
the prevalence of poor public investments financed by resource-related public revenue 
windfalls. Torvik (2009) suggest that one of the biggest issues concerning resource-rich 
countries is why massive domestic investments in some of them have not resulted in greater 
growth gains. Gelb (1988) estimated that more than half of the bonus gains from the rise in 
oil prices in the 1970s were invested in domestic projects. Any of the leading growth models 
would have predicted that following such significant public investment strong and sustainable 
economic growth would have occurred but this was not the case for several of the countries 
in this study. A number of reasonable arguments that have been advanced to explain why the 
expected growth failed to happen. In a study of the response by the Nigerian government to 
positive terms of trade shocks during the oil boom, Gavin (1993) found that the government 
largely invested in projects with high prestige and political gains but which made little 
economic sense. Nigeria is not the only country to behave like this. The tendency to invest in 
projects with negative social surplus is typical of many resource-rich African governments. 
Auty (2004), using a staple trap model, finds that most mineral exporting countries tend to be 
severely distorted by sub-optimal patterns of resource rent absorptions during periods of high 
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price volatility caused by overly ambitious government attempts to increase employment and 
other misjudgements in expenditure priorities. 
Several studies have also highlighted the strong relationship between resource abundance 
and conflict or war. Collier and Hoeffler (1998 and 2004) argue that resource-rich countries 
face conflict for two main reasons. First, the resource rents are used to buy weapons and pay 
the soldiers. Secondly, because resources often have a winner-takes-all quality with big 
payoffs for the winner and a limited need for cooperation with losers in the future to extract 
rents, resources trigger fierce struggles over control. A good example is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo that has suffered from social and political instability since its independence 
in the 1960s. The governments of Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria have launched large-scale 
military operations against the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram since 2012. Significant 
government expenditure has been directed towards buying military equipment and paying 
soldiers involved in the war. The cumulative military expenditure from 2012 -2015 for Chad, 
Cameroon and Nigeria was $1.8, $1.7 and $10.9 billion US dollars respectively.  
The approach of the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987) to sustainable growth is broad: “growth 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs and the management of human, natural and financial assets to 
increase long term economic wellbeing”. An economy that experiences rapid expenditure 
growth funded by the extraction of mineral resources without increasing its overall stock of 
wealth by investing in physical and human capital will not be able to sustain its economic 
growth in the long-run. Furthermore, such an economy runs the risk of sacrificing the wealth 
of future generations to finance current consumption, i.e. it fails even the Brundtland 
definition of sustainability. 
A growth strategy that is sustainable needs to account for the temporal and inter-
generational dimensions of resource wealth by ensuring that current growth does not come 
at the expense of future growth. It is important to acknowledge that the discovery of new 
mineral resources or an increase in the stock of reserves of existing mineral resources can 
also play a positive role.  
Adopting and implementing policies that increase savings and maximize rents from mineral 
resources, sustaining human capital investment, and putting in place transparent and 
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consistent fiscal policies will be vital to building a government’s policy credibility and expand 
the available space for public investment or free up resources to build fiscal reserves.  
For sustainable economic growth to be achieved it is also important that the revenues from 
mineral resources are reinvested into different types of productive capital. This requires a 
strong policy framework grounded by clear policy commitments. According to the World Bank 
(2013) such policy commitments should include 
(i) efforts to promote efficient resource extraction with a view to maximizing 
resource rents;  
(ii) a fiscal regime for the resource sector that enables the government to recover an 
equitable share of resource rents;  
(iii) well-designed investment that uses resource rents to generate sustainable returns 
over the long term.  
Challenges to Efficiently Managing Resource Rents 
The implementation of ‘best practice’ policies in mineral-based economies requires economic 
and political reforms that can prevent stakeholders seeking to capture a disproportionate 
share of mineral rents. This is very challenging especially as it has been shown that economies 
with low reserves to production ratios tend to be more likely to implement economically 
beneficial reforms which will help, diversify the economy (Auty, 2004; Eifert et al., 2003). On 
the other hand, countries with high reserves to production ratios tend to procrastinate on 
economic transformation reforms. The latter will use their minerals as collateral to secure 
loans to maintain current consumption patterns with the hope that the prices of their 
minerals will return to earlier high levels. One of the main issues that was highlighted earlier 
is the difficulty of finding accurate information on mineral resource stocks. In this study, it 
was necessary to gather mineral resource stocks from different sources as no source had data 
consistently for the period examined for the entire sample of countries. With the exception 
of Botswana and South Africa, there are no comprehensive data or statistics on wealth 
accounting nor even a pretence by the governments of Angola, Cameroon, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritania and Nigeria to create and regularly 
update accounts so as to show the evolution of the stock of mineral resources. As a first step 
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towards sustainable mineral resource management, the national authorities of these 
countries should develop resource accounts for their existing stock of minerals and ensure 
that these accounts are updated at regular intervals and in line with international best 
practices. Implementing this as well as the other recommendations of the United Nations 
SEEA would help to preserve, protect and enhance each country’s national wealth, thus 
building a foundation for the prosperity of  both present and future generations. 
Another difficulty with efficiently managing resource rents in order to achieve sustained 
economic growth involves determining the right proportion of the resource rents to invest 
and consume. The ultra-prudent approached is that all the resource rents should be invested 
and none should be consumed. This view is extreme and difficult to implement in real life, 
especially for developing countries which suffer from infrastructural constraint and a 
relatively high [youth] unemployment rate. The El Serafy method used in this study offers 
some guidance on how possibly to deal with this investment-consumption trade-off. 
Sustainability need not require that all resource rents be invested (as Hartwick suggested in 
1997); a portion can be consumed. Sustainable income is that part of resource receipts which 
if received infinitely would have a present value just equal to the present value of the finite 
stream of resource receipts over the lifetime of the resource. Therefore, the amount of 
resource rents available to invest is the sustainable income from the resource rents. When 
assessing different investment opportunities, the marginal returns offered by different types 
of public investment should be the determining factor. Cameroon, Chad and Congo, for 
example, suffer from a considerable lack infrastructure in the form of roads and railway lines, 
which is typical of many African countries. These deficiencies suggest that increased 
investment in road infrastructure will generate strong economic returns. Yet even though 
shortages of physical capital (roads) are certainly constraining development, on the other 
hand and in the medium term especially, the absorptive capacity of these countries is likely 
to be low and an overemphasis on these forms of capital may result in unproductive 
investments. Therefore, the time path for the use of revenues needs to be carefully thought 
out. One possibility is to keep at least some part of the revenues in a sovereign wealth fund 
in the short term, as is done by many of the oil-rich Middle-East Arab countries. As table 4 
shows, six out of eleven of the countries in this study have created a sovereign wealth fund 
whose objective is to accumulate assets that parallel the hypothetical ones in the El Serafy 
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calculation. According to Collier (2012), the classic sovereign wealth fund is inappropriate for 
low-income resource-rich countries because in capital inadequate economies, accumulating 
long-term foreign investments is not warranted and the central objective should be to 
develop domestic infrastructure. Similarly, Van der Ploeg (2008) argued that an international 
sovereign wealth fund is not appropriate for a capital-scarce country as it is too conservative 
in that it prevents any short-term increases in consumption. The opposing view is that it will 
be detrimental to the economy if an SWF can only invest domestically, because it will not be 
performing one of its major functions, which entails reducing Dutch disease pressures and 
thus would add to macroeconomic instability. Secondly, the SWF is exposed to domestic 
political pressures where special interest groups would push the implementation of 
investment projects, which very often have minimal economic justification (African Natural 
Resource Centre, 2016). 
While it is true that establishing an SWF with a well-defined mandate could be considered to 
be taking a step in the right direction, countries need to push even further and implement 
reforms that will improve the quality of institutions, which play a key role in the management 
of resource revenues. Good institutions are crucial because they ensure that investment 
projects are carefully selected, implemented and subsequently evaluated. This is why good 
governance and fiscal transparency should also be major priorities for resource-rich African 
countries. For these economies to achieve fiscal transparency, it is imperative that they follow 
good practices such as establishing an open budget process, making data on mineral 
resources publicly available and making sure that the data are of good quality.  
Conclusion 
Although many African countries are richly endowed in mineral resources and heavily reliant 
on them for economic welfare, the over-exploitation of these resources and the inadequate 
management of the associated revenues poses a threat for the sustainability of their income 
growth and development. The key policy question raised from this analysis is: how can these 
mineral rich economies embark on a sustainable resource revenue management and 
income growth path? Given the heterogeneity of mineral rich economies, it may seem 
unfeasible to formulate a single policy prescription that is consistent across the set of 
countries. This is true to a certain extent. However, the El Serafy approach which we 
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computed, notwithstanding country specific factors enables policy makers to estimate the 
portion of the revenues from resource extraction, which they can safely spend without 
diminishing the welfare of the future generations. It does not end here. The estimated User 
cost can be used to adjust standard measures of national income for the depletion of 
natural capital and in the process contribute in establishing a ’properly defined‘ national 
income which corrects for resource depletion to inform sustainable fiscal policy in these 
countries. Other complementary efforts on the part of the governments in these economies 
establishing an open budget process, fiscal transparency, developing mineral resources 
accounts (where they do not exists) which should be publicly accessible and regularly 
updated. Knowing the capacity constraints of many African governments and their difficulty 
in undertaking coherent sustainable resource management, this cannot be left entirely to 
policy makers and economic planners. It is equally contingent on extractive companies to 
understand that it is to their commercial advantage that minerals are exploited sustainably 
and the rents managed efficiently by government in order to provide an enabling 


















Appendix 1: Data Sources 
Angola 
Crude Oil and Natural Gas production figures source: OPEC Database, World Bank Database, 
USGS Mineral Yearbook. Diamond production estimates from the Kimberley Process Website, 
U.S Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summaries and the US Bureau of Mines 1987. 
Botswana 
Diamonds production figures source: Botswana Mineral Accounts Report, Statistics 
Botswana and Economic Accounting of Mineral Resources in Botswana, U.S Geological 
Survey Mineral Yearbook. 
Cameroon 
Crude Oil production figures source: “Banques des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale” database, 
World Bank Database, USGS Mineral Yearbook, U.S Geological Survey Mineral Commodity 
Summaries and the U.S Bureau of Mines 1987. 
Chad 
Crude Oil production figures source: “Banques des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale” database, 
World Bank Database, USGS Mineral Yearbook, U.S Geological Survey Mineral Commodity 
Summaries and the U.S Bureau of Mines 1987. 
Congo Brazzaville 
Oil & Natural Gas production data source: OPEC Database, U.S Geological Survey Mineral 
Yearbook, “Banques des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale” database. 
Equatorial Guinea  
Crude Oil & Natural Gas production figures data source: OPEC Database, “Banques des Etats 
de l'Afrique Centrale” database. 
Gabon 
Crude Oil & Natural Gas production figures data source: OPEC Database, “Banques des Etats 
de l'Afrique Centrale” database. Other major mineral is manganese but reliable production 
figures were unavailable.  
Ghana 
Crude Oil, Diamonds and Gold production figures data source: World Bank Database, US 
Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summaries, and US Bureau of Mines 1987. 
Mauritania 
Crude Oil, Copper, Gold and Iron-ore production figures data source: the Mauritania Natural 
Wealth for a Sustainable Future Report, United States Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, 
US Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summaries and US Bureau of Mines 1987. 
Nigeria 
Oil & Natural Gas production figures data source: the OPEC Database, the United States 
Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, US Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summaries 
and US Bureau of Mines 1987.  
South Africa 
Data on Coal, Gold, Platinum and Diamond production data source: Statistics South Africa, 
the South African Chamber of Mines, the South African Department of Trade & Industry and 
the Kimberley Process Website. 
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Appendix 2: Budget Sustainability Index   
Table 2a: Frequency of SBI greater than one suggesting the Budget is weakly sustainable 
Country Number of Years Average value 
Angola  13 years  1.92 
Botswana 0 years  0.42 
Cameroon 7 years 0.60 
Chad  2 years  0.43 
Congo, Rep 12 years  1.37 
Equatorial Guinea 11 years  1.88 
Gabon  8 years  0.96 
Ghana  4 years  0.37 
Mauritania 12 years  1.11 
Nigeria  9 years  1.12 
South Africa  4 years  0.47 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations.  
Table 2b: Frequency of ASBI less than one suggesting Budget is weakly sustainable 
Country Number of Years Average value 
Angola  11 years 2.0 
Botswana 0 years 5.9 
Cameroon 4 years 3.7 
Chad  5 years  4.7 
Congo, Rep 13 years 1.8 
Equatorial Guinea 8 years 4.3 
Gabon  9 years  2.3 
Ghana  4 years 4.1 
Mauritania 0 years 8.2 
Nigeria  9 years  2.5 
South Africa  16 years  0.3 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations. 
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Appendix 3: Institutional Quality Index for selected African countries  













Angola -1.28 -1.98 -1.31 -1.38 -1.49 -1.14 -8.58 
Botswana 0.86 1.01 0.56 0.65 0.58 0.82 4.49 
Cameroon -0.94 -0.96 -1.08 -1.12 -1.44 -1.33 -6.87 
Chad -0.99 -1.00 -0.64 -1.23 -1.26 -1.38 -6.49 
Congo, Rep -0.83 -1.22 -1.17 -1.23 -1.04 -0.86 -6.35 
Equatorial Guinea -1.52 -0.13 -0.96 -1.44 -1.28 -1.26 -6.60 
Gabon -1.10 -0.20 0.12 0.14 -0.65 -0.32 -2.02 
Ghana -0.21 -0.23 -0.12 -0.34 -0.23 -0.34 -1.48 
Mauritania -0.57 0.37 -0.12 -0.40 -0.50 -0.56 -1.79 
Nigeria -1.55 -1.06 -0.92 -0.97 -1.29 -1.19 -6.98 
South Africa 0.84 -0.38 1.02 0.52 0.09 0.73 2.82 
Source: World Bank (1995) 
 













Angola -1.23 -0.89 -1.14 -1.26 -1.43 -1.30 -7.24 
Botswana 0.59 1.06 0.65 0.67 0.64 1.16 4.78 
Cameroon -1.03 -0.18 -0.91 -0.93 -1.21 -1.18 -5.45 
Chad -1.31 -1.44 -1.38 -1.24 -1.51 -1.51 -8.39 
Congo, Rep -1.08 -1.17 -1.27 -1.31 -1.47 -1.04 -7.35 
Equatorial Guinea -1.68 -0.39 -1.43 -1.43 -1.46 -1.61 -8.01 
Gabon -0.67 -0.81 0.33 -0.15 -0.45 -0.83 -2.58 
Ghana 0.20 0.17 -0.19 -0.13 -0.12 -0.37 -0.43 
Mauritania -0.91 -0.23 -0.29 -0.37 -0.71 -0.56 -3.08 
Nigeria -0.87 -1.67 -0.89 -0.76 -1.35 -1.16 -6.70 
South Africa 0.65 -0.16 0.64 0.70 0.11 0.57 2.51 


















Angola -1.18 -0.50 -1.00 -0.91 -1.08 -1.39 -6.06 
Botswana 0.44 1.04 0.50 0.44 0.60 0.85 3.86 
Cameroon -0.95 -0.99 -0.77 -0.92 -0.98 -1.07 -5.68 
Chad -1.34 -0.97 -1.46 -1.21 -1.18 -1.36 -7.53 
Congo, Rep -1.02 -0.53 -1.02 -1.20 -1.08 -1.20 -6.04 
Equatorial Guinea -2.00 -0.21 -1.42 -1.35 -1.46 -1.77 -8.19 
Gabon -0.71 -0.73 0.02 -0.80 -0.55 -0.89 -3.67 
Ghana 0.50 -0.03 -0.25 -0.03 0.14 -0.20 0.13 
Mauritania -0.89 -0.64 -1.03 -0.87 -0.87 -0.92 -5.21 
Nigeria -0.37 -1.93 -0.96 -0.85 -0.96 -1.08 -6.15 
South Africa 0.65 -0.21 0.26 0.28 0.09 0.03 1.10 
Source: World Bank (2015) 
Appendix 4:  Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Table 4: Sovereign Wealth Funds in sub-Saharan Africa 
Country Fund Authority  Inception  Source of funding  
Angola Angola Sovereign Fund 2012 Oil 
Botswana Pula Fund 1996 Diamonds 
Equatorial Guinea Fund for Future Generations  2002 Oil  
Gabon  Sovereign Fund of Gabon 1998 Oil 
Ghana Ghana Stabilization Fund  





Nigeria Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority  2011 Oil  
Source: International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds (2008) 
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Appendix 5: Mineral Commodities Yearly Prices Fluctuations 
Figure 18a: Aluminium, Copper, Iron-ore, Gold, Manganese Price Fluctuations 
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 
 
Figure 18b: Coal Price Fluctuations 
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Figure 18c: Crude Oil and Natural Gas Price Fluctuations 
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 
 
Figure 18d: Diamonds Price Fluctuations 

























Figure 18e: Platinium Group Metals Price Fluctuations 
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 
 
APPENDIX 6: Mineral Commodities Annualized Price Volatility 
Figure 19a: Aluminium and Copper Price Volatility 













































































Figure 19b: Crude Oil and Natural Gas Price Volatility  
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 
 
Figure 19c: Gold Price Volatility  































































































































Figure 19d: Platinium $/Oz Price Fluctuations 
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 
 
Appendix 7: Public Health and Education Expenditure 
Figure 20: Public Health Expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
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Figure 21a: Education Expenditure as a percentage of GDP (1990-2002) 
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators, Domestic National Accounts 
Figure 21b: Education Expenditure as a percentage of GDP (2003-2015) 
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Appendix 8: Sustainable income as a percentage of Resource rent 
Figure 22a: Sustainable income as a percentage of total resource rent (1990-2002) 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations.  
 
Figure 22b: Sustainable income as a percentage of total resource rent (2003-2015) 
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Appendix 9: Primary Fiscal Balance 
Figure 23a: Angola Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
Figure 23b: Botswana Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Angola











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Botswana
Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI) Primary Fiscal Balance (% GDP)
63 
 
Figure 23c: Cameroon Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
Figure 23d: Chad Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 23e: Congo, Rep Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics  
Figure 23f: Equatorial Guinea Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 23g: Gabon Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics  
Figure 23h: Ghana Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 23i: Mauritania Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
Figure 23j: Nigeria Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 23k: South Africa Primary Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
Appendix 10: Overall Fiscal Balance 
Figure 24a: Angola Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 24b: Botswana Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics  
Figure 24c: Cameroon Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 24d: Chad Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
Figure 24e: Congo, Rep Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 24f: Equatorial Guinea Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 24g: Gabon Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 24h: Ghana Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 24i: Mauritania Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 24j: Nigeria Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 24k: South Africa Overall Fiscal Balance (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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APPENDIX 11: National Debt  
Figure 25a: Angola National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 25b: Botswana National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 25c: Cameroon National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 25d: Chad National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 25e: Congo, Rep National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 25f: Equatorial Guinea National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 25g: Gabon National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics  
 
Figure 25h: Ghana National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 25i: Mauritania National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations, International Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 25j: Nigeria National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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Figure 25k: South Africa National Debt (% ANNI vs % GDP) 2000-2015 
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